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Deception as Interpersonal Conflict Strategy |
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TS-Si News Service | |||
Tuesday, 24 May 2011 09:00 | |||
Coral Gables, FL, USA. Modern-day game
![]() The study shows that bluffing works because an opponent comes to believe you are strong, but can't tell whether your strength or true or only an act. Economist Christopher Cotton from the University of Miami (UM) and Chang Liu, a PhD Student at the Georgia Institute of Technology, explore two of history's most famous military bluffs in the Journal of Peace Research. The study is one of the first to use game theory to assess the Chinese military legends of Li Guang and his 100 horsemen (144 BC), and Zhuge Liang and the Empty City (228 AD). The stories appear in modern day translations of Sun Tzu's fundamental book on military strategy The Art of War to explain what is meant by deception. Game theory is a field of mathematics that started to gain ground in the 1940's. The theory basically says that what I want to do depends on what you do, and what you want to do depends on what I'm doing. It provides a way to model strategic situations, in which the success of an individual's choices depends on the choices of opponent(s). The study authors asked what strategy people should follow in such situations.Both legends involve a military that faces a much stronger opposing force. Instead of retreating, the commander of the weaker army orders his men to act as if they were preparing to bait the enemy into an ambush. The stronger army unsure of whether they are facing a weak army or an ambush decides to retreat and evade combat. In other words, the stronger opponent falls for the bluff. The legends have been used for the past two-thousand years to illustrate military deception. What is new about this study is that it explains why their strategies were successful, says Christopher Cotton assistant professor in the Department of Economics at the UM School of Business Administration, and principal investigator of the study. "With this study we gain insight about these legends that nobody had before. For example, bluffing doesn't work because it convinces an opponent that you are strong. It works because your opponent can't tell whether you are really strong, or whether you are only acting strong. This uncertainty is all that's needed," says Cotton. "The generals chose strategies that left their opponents uncertain, and this uncertainty was enough to avoid confrontation." Cotton modeled the military legends as signaling games, where one player has all the information about the situation and the other does not. Equilibrium is achieved when the participants or "players" adopt strategies or "actions" that bring about the best outcome, or "payoff." These optimal strategies can be described as a situation where "what I'm doing should be consistent with what you have chosen to do, and given what you have chosen to do, I should not want to go do something else," says Cotton. In the case of the military legends, the researchers found that bluffing arose naturally as the optimal strategy in each situation. The study says that "when the probability of a weak general is high, the equilibrium involves mix strategies, with weak general sometimes fleeing and sometimes bluffing….when the probability of a weak general is lower (which is reasonable given the reputations of Li Guang and Zhuge Liang), then the unique equilibrium always involves bluffing by the general and retreat by his opponent." What the researchers are showing is that these famous generals were acting according to optimal strategy, as defined by modern-day strategic reasoning. "They are playing in a way that is consistent to what we would recommend them doing today, even though they were doing it two-thousand years before any of the modern tools for strategy were developed," Cotton says. The study adds to the literature in which game theory is used to gain insight of historic events. It increases understanding on the role of deception in military and defense strategies and explores the logic used by experienced professionals, who unknowingly play strategic games to create innovative solutions to everyday problems. Citation100 Horsemen and the empty city: A game theoretic examination of deception in Chinese military legend. Christopher Cotton and Chang Liu. Journal of Peace Research 2011; 48(2): 217-223. doi:10.1177/0022343310396265
Download PDF Abstract We present game theoretic models of two of the most famous military bluffs from history. These include the legend of Li Guang and his 100 horsemen (144 BC), and the legend of Zhuge Liang and the Empty City (228 AD). In both legends, the military commander faces a much stronger opposing army, but instead of ordering his men to retreat, he orders them to act in a manner consistent with baiting the enemy into an ambush. The stronger opposing army, uncertain whether it is facing a weak opponent or an ambush, then decides to flee and avoid battle. Military scholars refer to both stories to illustrate the importance of deception in warfare, often highlighting the creativity of the generals' strategies. We model both situations as signaling games in which the opponent is uncertain whether the general is weak (i.e. has few soldiers) or strong (i.e. has a larger army waiting to ambush his opponent if they engage in combat). We then derive the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the games. When the probability of a weak general is high enough, the equilibrium involves mixed strategies, with weak generals sometimes fleeing and sometimes bluffing about their strength. The equilibrium always involves the generals and their opponents acting as they did in the historical examples with at least a positive probability. When the probability of a weak general is lower (which is reasonable given the reputations of Li Guang and Zhuge Liang), then the unique equilibrium always involves bluffing by the general and retreat by his opponent. Keywords: bluffing, deception, deterrence, game theory, signaling game.
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Last Updated on Monday, 23 May 2011 20:30 |