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Selfish Actions Based on Negative Perceptions of People Print E-mail
Living - Relationships
TS-Si News Service   
Thursday, 14 April 2011 09:00
Bonn, Germany. The expectations people have about how others will behave play a large role in determining whether people cooperate with each other or not. And that very first expectation, or impression, is hard to change.

This is particularly true when the impression is a negative one, as shown by so-called public good games. One’s own expectation thereby becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: those who expect people to act selfishly, actually experience uncooperative behavior from others more often.


The conclusions come from a study by Michael Kurschilgen from the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in Bonn, summarizing the key findings of a study he conducted with colleagues Christoph Engel and Sebastian Kube.



Broken Windows Theory

The basic idea behind broken windows is that urban disorder and vandalism can, over time, set norms and signal approval of additional crime and anti-social behavior.

Social scientists James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling introduced the theory in an article, titled Broken Windows, which appeared in The Atlantic Monthly (March 1982).

Their theory states that monitoring and maintaining urban environments in a well-ordered condition may prevent further vandalism as well as an escalation into more serious crime.

The article sparked considerable debate among social scientists and the public.

The broken windows theory has been the basis for several reforms in criminal policy since it found support from several empirical studies.

However, it also has been subject to the criticism by crominologists who argue the theory is too narrow to account for broader trends and policies.

Others among the public argue the theory places too much dependence on government action at the expense of gun ownership and self-defense.

Beyond the interests of criminologists, the theory has been used to investigate interpersonal behavior and performance expectations.
In previous studies, other researchers had successfully put participants in Bonn and London into a social dilemma with such games, which are very popular in experimental economics. The authors used them as a template for their study, which focuses on an aspect that ought to be of interest to social policymakers and town planners too.

"We wanted to find out whether the broken windows theory held true in the lab as well," explained Michael Kurschilgen. According to this theory, minor details, like broken windows in abandoned buildings or rubbish on the streets, can give rise to desolate conditions like the utter neglect of a district.

"Such signs of neglect give people the impression that social standards do not apply there," says Kurschilgen, explaining the idea behind the theory, which was the motivation behind New York mayor Rudy Giuliani's decision to embark on the zero-tolerance strategy he employed to clean up the city in the 1990s.

The study tested the theory in a scientific experiment. Using the kind of public good games that are often applied in the field of experimental economics, the aim was to find out the extent to which first impressions determine how people will behave, and the extent to which this can be influenced by selective information.

The games are set up around the classic dilemma of self-interest and socially minded behavior:
  • Each member of a group of four players is given the sum of 20 tokens. They can either keep these for themselves or invest them in a community project.

  • Each player receives 0.4 tokens in return for each of the tokens they invest in the community project. If all four group members invest their 20 tokens, each one of them receives 32 tokens, in other words 12 tokens more than if they all keep the money for themselves.

  • But if only three of them invest their money in the community, the selfish fourth player gets 44 tokens.

  • So even the free rider profits from the other players' investment in the community fund.

"The public good game thus creates a social dilemma," explains the economist. That's because it would be best for the community if everybody invested in the collective. However, on an individual level the free rider gets the best out of it. They ultimately receive the bonus without having made the investment.

Surprisingly, there are significant differences between Bonn and London in the willingness to invest in the common good.
  • Londoners invested a mere 43 per cent, on average, in the common good.

  • In Bonn, the figure was 82 per cent.

"This is probably down to differing expectations of what constitutes normal behavior," postulates Kurschilgen. Individuals who assume that the others will act selfishly too are hardly likely to commit altruistic deeds themselves.

"From that point of view, Londoners have a more pessimistic view of man than do the participants in Bonn," he concludes in respect of the Brits' reticence. Consequently, whether a person decides to behave cooperatively or not depends strongly on how that person thinks the other players will behave.

In their series of experiments, the authors told their newly recruited players from Bonn the results of the London study.
  • The players in the new round of games evidently reacted very negatively to the information that few of the players in the previous experiments in London had exhibited cooperative behavior.

  • Unlike the virtuous people of Bonn from the previous rounds, they showed far fewer pretensions of being good citizens: instead of investing more than 80 per cent in the common good, the participants in these experiments contributed just 51 per cent, on average.

Therefore, the negative information was enough to revise the previously positive image held by the Bonn residents. This model did not really work the other way around — good examples did not make bad teammates into goody two-shoes.

"Our findings demonstrate that the core of the 'broken windows' theory does actually hold true. Faced with a social dilemma, people are guided to a very great extent by their original expectations of what other people will do, but they are also particularly sensitive to negative impressions," says Kurschilgen, summing up the observations.

Given this conclusion, it is clear to him that every cent spent on maintaining residential districts does more than just make the neighbourhood look prettier — it also represents a sound investment against crime.

CitationCan we manage first impressions in cooperation problems? An experimental study on “Broken (and Fixed) Windows”. Christoph Engel, Sebastian Kube, Michael J. Kurschilgen. Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011; MPI Collective Goods Preprint No. 2011/5.
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Abstract

Cooperation problems are at the heart of many everyday situations. In this paper, we propose a very simple and light-handed mechanism to sustain cooperation and test its performance in a rich laboratory environment. The mechanism moderates cooperation by controlling experiences, more specifically, it "manipulates" subjects’ initial beliefs by providing them with selective information about (un)cooperative behavior in other, unrelated, groups. We observe that contributions are considerably sensitive to such selective information. First impressions participants happen to make predict subsequent behavior. Our results, however, suggest an asymmetry in the strength of the reaction — which might pose a limit on the effectiveness of the mechanism in natural settings.

Keywords: public good, behavioral uncertainty, conditional cooperation, information, first impressions, broken windows.

JEL Classifications: C91, D03, D83, H41, K14, K42.

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TS-Si is dedicated to the acceptance, medical treatment, and legal protection of individuals correcting the misalignment of their brains and their anatomical sex, while supporting their transition into society as hormonally reconstituted and surgically corrected citizens.

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Last Updated on Wednesday, 13 April 2011 08:06
 
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